By Zdung Trieu law firm
When expectant observers failed to hear the familiar whup-whup sound of the Bell UH-1 Iroquois or "Huey" helicopter, the new sound of rotors slicing the air at the former Clark Air Base heralded the arrival of the Philippine Air Force's new armed light utility helicopter, the Sokol W3A. 
Its acquisition is part of the government's military modernization plan that aims to purchase both refurbished and new aircraft, ships, vehicles and other weapons both for internal security and a subsequent transition to external defense. While the delivery of the Sokols are nominally part of the armed forces' counter-insurgency/internal security operations procurement package, the armed helicopters land at a time that the Philippines is jousting with China over contested maritime territories in the South China Sea. 
Four of the eight Sokols arrived at Villamor Air Base this month from the helicopter company's factory in Poland. The eight Sokol (Polish for "Falcon") light utility helicopters, which were purchased for 2.8 billion pesos (US$64.4 million) from Polish company PZL Swidnik, can mount an M60 machine gun on each side, come equipped with night vision devices and unlike the older Hueys can transport 10 rather than seven passengers. The helicopters have a maximum airspeed of 140.5 knots, a range of 402 nautical miles and can stay aloft for three consecutive hours. The remaining four birds are scheduled for delivery in the latter part of 2012. The procurement is part of the government's three-phase, five billion peso per year Capability Upgrade Program, or CUP. Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin has expressed second-phase plans to purchase six jet trainers for the Lead-In Fighter Trainer (LIFT) program that can also be configured for air-to-air and ground attack roles. With a proposed budget of 1 billion pesos each, Gazmin said the government is weighing potential suppliers, including the Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) T/A-50 Golden Eagle and Alenia Aermacchi M-346. The Philippine Air Force (PAF) said the procurement of LIFT planes is a logical next step in preparing Filipino pilots to fly more advanced fighter and attack aircraft. "You can't build a fighter capability overnight," a PAF source was quoted saying in local media. The Department of Defense (DoD), meanwhile, said in a January statement that it is studying the feasibility of procuring anti-ship missiles to bolster the country's maritime security, which currently badly lags China's capability and firepower. The Philippine Navy, on the other hand, is working on the acquisition of a 2 billion peso multi-role vessel that can be used for military transport and disaster response, according to navy chief Vice Admiral Alexander Pama. Under CUP's first phase, the navy's three Jacinto class patrol vessels (formerly Peacock class ships from the United Kingdom) underwent upgrades of their command and control systems and installed new M242 Bushmaster 25 mm cannons. Further upgrades and overhaul of the machinery are also underway. Two Patrol Killer Medium class boats (PKM or Chamsuri class) were also acquired from South Korea in 2006, bringing its fleet of the said boats to seven. Power projectionWhile Manila gears up the second phase of its military modernization plan, future procurements are expected to boost the Philippines' ability to project power in relation to its territorial dispute with China over the mineral-rich Spratly Islands. The group of reefs and islets in the South China Sea (the Philippine government since last year officially refers to this body of water as the West Philippine Sea) has a host of claimants among neighboring countries in Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, along with Taiwan and China. Whereas the other countries lay claim only to a handful of the reefs or islets, China claims the entire Spratly Island group as its territory. The first major Philippine-China row over the islands occurred in 1995 when China occupied Mischief Reef (which the Philippines refers to as Panganiban Reef) located 200 kilometers off the western coast of Palawan, well within the Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Subsequent years have seen a series of minor encounters involving fishermen caught poaching in the disputed waters. Tensions ratcheted last year with several incidents of Chinese naval ships harassing oil exploration and fishing vessels in areas claimed by Philippines, triggering a flurry of diplomatic protests. Beyond issuing diplomatic protests and leaning on its long-time ally the United States for support, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) lags China's power projection capabilities. The Philippine Navy is comparatively feeble and until August 2011 still had a World War II-era destroyer escort as its flagship. It cannot project airpower beyond several jet trainers configured as light fighters and small observation planes converted for light attack roles. As the new Sokols are geared for armed troop transport with slightly more powerful engines than the PAF's workhorse Hueys, defense analysts do not see the new birds playing a major role in any armed dispute with China over the Spratly Islands. With the external defense-oriented, phase two of CUP still in its initial stages, the Philippines' defense capability over the Spratlys is still weak. But Manila is clearly now trying to turn crisis into opportunity, leveraging China's recent aggression to speed up and pump more funds into its military modernization plans. Though President Benigno Aquino has said on several occasions that the Philippines will support all efforts, including those led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to peacefully resolve the dispute over the Spratlys, his government has taken several steps to bolster its military capabilities and forge stronger links with Washington specifically to counterbalance China's perceived aggression in the South China Sea. Aquino warned China's Defense Minister Liang Guanglie during the latter's visit to the Philippines in May 2011 that an increase in the number of incidents in contested areas of the Spratlys would lead to a regional arms race. "We might not have the capabilities now, but [China's intrusions] might force us to increase our capabilities also," Aquino told Liang. Mighty revenuesThe Spratlys are believed to straddle untapped rich deposits of oil and natural gas. The presence of natural gas in Malampaya, located 80 kilometers off the northwest coast of Palawan (proximate to but not part of the Spratlys), was first discovered in 1992. The Malampaya gas field is now a joint project of the Philippines' Department of Energy and the Shell Philippines Exploration BV, and is estimated to contain 3.7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 85 million barrels of condensate. In 2001, the Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power project was inaugurated, and commercial operations commenced a year later. Under its joint-venture scheme, 45% of the stake is owned by Shell Philippines, a Dutch company, while US company Chevron owns another 45% stake. The remaining 10% is owned by the Philippine government under the PNOC Exploration Corp. The Philippine government has received a total of 228.5 billion pesos in revenue from the project since it began commercial operations. In 2011, Manila received $1.1 billion in royalties. 
Though the Philippine government receives only a miniscule 10% of the earnings from the oil fields, the billions of pesos this translates to on an annual basis have become a source of funds for beefing up defense over the islets. The Department of Energy maintains a special account in the government's General Account known as Fund 151, which handles the Malampaya project's revenues. Budget Secretary Florencio Abad said that all expenses for securing the natural gas wells will be charged to Fund 151's account. 
"It will fund necessary capability requirements of the AFP in its territorial defense operations, including providing a strong security perimeter for the Malampaya natural gas and power project," Abad said. Last year, the government authorized the release of 4.9 billion pesos for this purpose. An estimated 423 million pesos were mobilized to purchase a retired Hamilton-class high endurance cutter from the US through the US Foreign Military Sales program. The 378-foot long cutter, formerly known as USCGC Hamilton, has been renamed the BRP Gregorio del Pilar (after the young Filipino general who was killed defending Tirad Pass against American soldiers in 1899). Displacing more than 3,000 tons with a maximum speed of 28 knots, the cutter will replace the Cannon-class Rajah Humabon as the Philippine Navy's flagship. Though its surface search radar and Phalanx CIWS were removed before delivery to the Philippines, the cutter has undergone refitting and rearming to equip it for its patrol duties in the

Spratlys. The plan for securing Malampaya entails the procurement of three such vessels. The Hamilton's sister ship, the USCGC Dallas, will be decommissioned and turned over to the Philippine government in either the first or second quarter of this year. In December 2011, defense secretary Gazmin led a delegation to Washington seeking permission to purchase a third sister ship. The AFP's modernization for external defense appears to be running along two parallel lines: weapons to be acquired under phase two of CUP and those funded by Malampaya project revenues ostensibly for use in securing the natural gas wells that are geographically close to the disputed Spratlys. One defense analyst based in the Philippines noted that it was rather "fortuitous" that the Chinese chose to "act up just as Phase 1 - the ISO [internal security operations]-centric phase - ended". Indeed, the threat that China poses not only to isles and reefs in the South China Sea claimed by the Philippines but also to the country's revenue-generating sites like Malampaya have proved to be a strong spur to the Aquino administration to fast-track and prioritize the acquisition of more modern weapons. Though under CUP phase two the government plans to acquire just trainer aircraft for the LIFT program, as part of the long planned transition to multi-role combat aircraft, Aquino announced in December 2011 his intent to go one step further and purchase second-hand F-16 fighters from the US. In January this year, the Department of National Defense (DND) announced 138 projects to modernize the AFP. No other details were given in regard to the source of funding (whether through the CUP allocation or revenues from Malampaya), nor did the DND give specific details as to what kind of aircraft or naval vessels and other equipment are on its wish list. Air Force Vice Commander Maj Gen Renato Lorenzo Sanchez said 56 new aircraft and 23 refurbished ones will be purchased, along with high-tech gear like a 3-D radar system. His statement, however, implied that most if not all of the items targeted for acquisition will be for territorial defense: "By 2016, we shall have expanded our air space and maritime domain awareness and provided territorial defense capability." Acquiring such weaponry, however, will not automatically lead to immediate combat readiness and attaining an external defense capability sufficient to offer deterrence vis-เ-vis China will take years. A good example of the time required can be seen in the training required to fly multi-role combat aircraft. Dzirhan Mahadzir, a defense analyst based in Kuala Lumpur, said pilot training in a modern fighter aircraft at the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) usually lasts one to three years, not including the time for training to be a regular pilot and later for lead-in fighter training. The RMAF has a LIFT program in place and has operated multi-role combat aircraft for the past several years. In contrast, the Philippines has not had a fighter aircraft since 2005, when the F-5 was retired. (The PAF's S-211 is a trainer aircraft). To be fair, the quote from Maj Gen Sanchez implies that the armed forces recognize that it needs at least four years to play catch up. Long-time allyThe Philippines' wild card appears to be its rejuvenated strategic alliance with the US - at least until it has the time to develop a strong indigenous territorial defense capability. For decades, the country enjoyed American protection, especially during the time when two of the biggest American military bases outside of the US mainland, Subic and Clark, were located in the Philippines. US President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, during their tour of the region last year, promoted a peaceful resolution to the competing claims in the Spratlys. The US government's actions, however, have expressed explicitly its intentions of making its presence strongly felt in the region to counter-balance China's rising military might and influence. On one hand, Washington has engaged Southeast Asian countries through ASEAN, the East Asia Summit and other regional forums to assert its stance that the South China Sea should remain as a neutral sea lane in the region. On the other, it has recently strengthened military links with allies in the region, including Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines. The US has renewed strategic ties with former Cold War era adversary Vietnam, symbolized most potently by the docking of the US Navy aircraft carrier USS George Washington last year at Danang naval base, which was held and used by the Americans during the Vietnam War. Washington also lifted its 10-year moratorium on material support for Indonesia's KOPASSUS commando unit due to its history of human rights abuses. The massive Cobra Gold joint military exercises between US, Thai and other regional troops have continued and expanded in recent years. As a clear demonstration of support for its Philippine ally, the US Navy and Marines conducted an 11-day Cooperation Afloat Readiness Training (CARAT) military exercise at the height of the Spratlys crisis last year, this time off the coast of Palawan, just a few hundred nautical miles from the disputed territory. Several US warships also paid port calls to Manila in 2011 and so far this year. The US also announced it will soon deploy 2,500 US Marines to Australia, complementing America's berthing rights in Singapore for its naval ships. It is often said that in international relations there are no permanent friends, only permanent interests. Though still smarting from its expulsion out of its two biggest military bases in the region in 1991 by the Philippine Senate, the US has a new common interest with the Philippines in the form of China's recent aggression in the Spratlys. As the two allies tiptoe around the Philippine constitutional provision banning foreign military bases in the country, the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) forged in 1999 has allowed the US to rotate some 600 troops, some of whom belong to elite special operations units, in southern Mindanao in pursuit of Washington's ongoing war on terror. Now, the current crisis over the Spratlys has given both sides an excuse to work side by side in resisting China, despite protests from Philippine nationalists and leftists who fear the country could get caught in a crossfire should the US and China eventually clash. Analysts wonder up to what extent the US would help the Philippines if a shooting war broke out with China, particularly if the Philippine military was only strong enough to offer token resistance to China. It's also unclear whether the Philippines-US Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 would cover an aggressor's attack against Philippine assets in disputed islands outside of the country's jurisdiction. With the first phase of CUP now concluded and the second one in the works, how will the Philippines' defense infrastructure look in the near future? Strategic analysts already wonder whether the Aquino administration (and the next one) will have the political will and sufficient funds to sustain modernization efforts. More important, they wonder whether the AFP will eventually be able to run independently a modern external defense system, or will history repeat itself and see the Philippines lapse back to dependency on the US for its own security and protection? Doubts are rising across the region whether the US could really deter China in a future shooting war. As of now, the Philippines has taken initial steps to build a more credible military defense against China and other neighboring countries, not only for the bounty that the Spratlys offers but for its own territorial integrity. Building and maintaining the required support infrastructure such as enhanced air and naval bases, radar facilities and missile systems to support more modern air and naval assets, not to mention the extensive training of soldiers to manage these facilities, will take years to accomplish. Until then, the Philippines will continue to rely on diplomatic ties with its regional neighbors and military links with the US to keep the Chinese dragon at bay. George Amurao, a former journalist in Manila, until recently worked for the Southeast Asian Press Alliance. He is now with Mahidol University International College in Bangkok, Thailand.

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